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JUST SCHOOLS: THE IDEA OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICAN ED-
UCATION. By .David L. Kirp. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 1982. Pp. xiii, 374. $19.95. 
The decision of the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education 1 
recalls to many comment~tors a moment when morality and constitutional 
principle coalesced in a ringing pronouncement that seemed to promise the 
transformation of American society.2 Nearly three decades later, the elu-
siveness of the vision of racial equality mandated by the Court continues to 
vex educators, legislators, judges and commentators. In Just Schools, 
David Kirp uses case histories of five Bay Area communities - San Fran-
cisco, Richmond, Berkeley, Sausalito and Oakland - to provide an unu-
sual glimpse into the multifarious processes that have thwarted realization 
of the Brown ideal. 
Kirp begins by identifying the linkage in Brown between "racial fair-
ness" and "educational equity" as the fundamental source of complexity in 
the "quest for racial justice in education" (p. 1). He then separates the 
question of policymaking into two broad categories - uniform versus idio-
syncratic standards, and legal versus political modes of decision (p. 1). The 
functional interaction of these elements - "process and substance, politics 
and principle" - is the focus of his analysis. ''The central puzzle of this 
book is: How does an essentially political process involving each branch 
and level of government shape race and schooling policy over time, in light 
of the larger normative concerns summoned by the question?" (p.11). The 
case histories, which comprise Part Two of Just Schools, successfully illumi-
nate this descriptive inquiry. These well-developed studies capture in sharp 
relief the personalities and political forces that shaped the course of events 
in each community, in much the same way that Richard K.luger captured 
the history leading to Brown in Simple Justice .3 Kirp is less successful, 
however, at responding in Part Three to the "prescriptive concern: What 
mix of politics and constitutionalism, and federal and local decision-mak-
ing best serves the ends of racial justice?" (pp. 11-12). 
Just Schools opens with an examination of the ideal of racial equality in 
the context of public education. Kirp suggests that "the Brown decision is 
clearer about the nature of the wrong than about the dimensions of the 
right" (p. 20). The post-Brown notion of racial equality has been conceptu-
alized in three divergent ways. First, the "integrationist" view rejects the 
classical liberal insistence on color blindness and requires instead deliberate 
racial mixing.4 The "redistributionist" view focuses on improving condi-
tions within the black community. The redistributionist demands remedial 
efforts to undo the effects of past discrimination. Finally, the "black 
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I). 
2. See Yudof, Nondiscrimination and Beyond, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 97, 97-98 (W. 
Stephan & J. Feagin eds. 1980). 
3. R. Kl.UGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975). 
4. Integration is thus distinct from desegregation, the mere removal of formal racial barri-
ers. P. 22. 
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power" view "looks not to abolishing the ghetto but to securing the commu-
nity's control over its institutions" (p. 24). Kirp notes that despite their dis-
parities, these views all contemplate action beyond simply abolishing legal 
racism, and thus encounter greater resistance than strategies limited to non-
discrimination (pp. 25-26). 
According to Kirp, Brown initially "shift[ed] the terms of discourse" on 
educational equality from resources to outcomes (p. 41). Later studies 
seemed to indicate that desegregation, even coupled with federal programs 
such as Head Start and Title I, had little impact on the educational achieve-
ment of minority children and so undermined much of the impetus neces-
sary to sustain desegregation efforts. That educational failure, coupled with 
foot-dragging on desegregation in many cities and resegregation resulting 
from "white flight," fueled movements in predominantly black urban 
school districts away from integration toward "community control" (pp. 47-
48). 
Just Schools then turns to post-Brown legal developments and the inter-
play of law and politics in the formulation of educational policy. Kirp as-
serts the importance of constitutional values as a necessary underpinning of 
the policy process, and the role of courts as the ultimate arbiter of those 
values. He cautions, however, that courts have numerous limitations in the 
area of educational dispute resolution. Beginning with Brown II, 5 the 
Supreme Court recognized that desegregation decrees must be brokered on 
a case-by-case basis. He argues that because "[c]ourts cannot run school 
systems" (p. 59), the implementation of their decrees depends on the coop-
eration of the parties to the dispute. 
The five Bay Area case histories provide numerous insights into the con-
flicts of policy and process earlier explored by Kirp. A few general observa-
tions are particularly noteworthy. First, the expectation of the NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund, as described by Richard Kluger, that a Supreme 
Court decision declaring segregation unconstitutional would avoid the ne-
cessity of"spend[ing] the next half-century arguing cases of unequal educa-
tional facilities one by one,"6 has proven chimerical. As Kirp observes, 
"The contemporary reality ofrace and schooling policy ... makes a sham-
bles of the hoped-for uniformity. What prevails is not a single national 
standard, authoritatively set and effectively implemented, but rather a be-
wildering diversity of arrangements, ad hoc in nature, varying enormously 
both in content and in implementation" (p. 7). Second, judicial demands 
for immediate results, such as the "Integrate Now" command of Alexander 
v. Holmes County Board of Education, 1 ignore the reality that desegration is 
a complicated process that does require a great deal of preparation. In San 
Francisco, a federal court allowed only six weeks for formulating a desegre-
gation plan; the hastily devised plan that resulted was seriously flawed. 
More "deliberation" and less "speed" might have produced a plan whose 
consequences would have done much more to advance racial equality (pp. 
101-03, 107-10). 
5. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
6. R. Kl.UGER, supra note 3, at 284. 
7. 396 U.S. 19 (1969). See also B. WOODWARD & s. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 36-56 
(1979). 
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In Part Three, Kirp evaluates the status and prospects of the educational 
systems and desegregation plans of his five communities. He finds that the 
turmoil and extremism which characterized much of the 1960s and 1970s 
has dissipated (pp. 254-55). In San Francisco, the first major northern city 
to desegregate under court order, bureaucratic indifference crippled a pre-
mature plan that "stressed racial balance and had little educational con-
tent" (p. 261). In Sausalito and Berkeley, which integrated voluntarily after 
elaborate and comprehensive preparation, the systems were hardly in place 
before conflicting forces of "black power, separatism, and experimentalism" 
(p. 259) began to displace them. In Richmond, opponents of desegregation 
gained firm control of the schools, and in cutting the budget, eliminated 
busing from the voluntary open enrollment plan which marked the extent 
of the district's commitment to racial equality in education (pp. 145-46, 
260). "In Oakland, demography outpaced policy" (p. 258); efforts were 
refocused, as in other overwhelmingly black urban districts like Detroit and 
Atlanta, on asserting black control over the administration and resources of 
the system (p. 262). 
Kirp has succeeded in posing the significant problems involved in 
achieving racial equality in education, and his case histories make a worth-
while addition to the literature on the subject. His conclusion, however, in 
which he proposes policy directions for the future, is less satisfactory. His 
largely dispassionate presentation of those issues and events neglects to take 
value-based positions critical to his concluding policy arguments. 
What is glaringly absent from Just Schools is any appreciation of the 
value of the constitutional right mandated by Brown. The educational ben-
efits of desegregation are identified in Making Desegregation Work,8 an im-
pressive recent study that makes a fine companion volume to Just Schools. 
Making Desegregation Work emphasizes that schools teach important 
things that are not measured by achievement test scores. They "do not just 
teach youth; they socialize youth into adulthood."9 Moreover, William 
Ryan, a psychologist, argues that educational dividends are irrelevant to 
racial equality in providing desegregated schools. He observes, "When 
drinking fountains were desegregated, no one expected the water quality to 
improve; when lunch counters were desegregated, the hamburgers and 
Cokes didn't taste any better . . . . And no one expected black kids in de-
segregated swimming pools to start swimming faster .... " 10 For Ryan, 
educational benefits are not necessary to justify Brown's holding; desegrega-
thm is morally essential. 
In contrast, Kirp is equivocal toward the constitutional principle in-
volved in equal educational treatment. He purports to disagree with the 
Supreme Court's requirement of proof of intentional segregation 11 in cases 
involving Northern school districts. He argues that "the injury that chil-
dren suffer from racial separation has nothing to do with its cause. Does a 
8. R. CRAIN, R. MAHARD & R. NAROT, MAKING DESEGREGATION WORK (1982) [herein-
after cited as CRAIN]. 
9. Id. at 12. 
10. W. RYAN, EQUALITY 159 (1981). 
11. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. l, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
1102 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 81:1099 
black fourth grader know that her school is 95 percent black only because 
officials gerrymandered the attendance zone? Does it matter?" (p. 285). 
Kirp instead favors uniform minimum integration, defined by Justice 
Powell in his separate opinion in Keyes v. School District, 12 as a baseline 
constitutional principle. He adds, "[b]eyond the uniform minimum obliga-
tion, racial concerns are, as Justice Powell notes, properly weighed against 
'other, equally important educational interests which a community may as-
sert' " 13 (p. 286). Presumably the weighing process would rule out busing, 
since Justice Powell is one of the Court's strongest advocates of the value of 
"neighborhood schools."14 In fact, Kirp argues that a showing of intent 
should be required when district-wide or metropolitan-wide relief is con-
templated (pp. 287-88). Thus, his minimum constitutional standard is mini-
mal indeed . 
. Yet, having insisted on a segregative intent test to justify district or met-
ropolitan-wide remedies, Kirp closes by deploring the racial gap between 
city and suburban schools. He notes that the number of urban school sys-
tems with majority-white enrollment dropped from four of the ten largest 
and sixteen of the thirty largest in 1968, to one of ten and eight of thirty 
only eight years later (p. 301). He concludes: 
Such a transformation jeopardizes our sense of the public school as an in-
stitution critical to the nation's well-being . . . . These schools may in-
stead come to be regarded as a welfare service, provided as a matter of 
largesse to the less favored members of the society. That perception of 
public schools as charity schools was strongly resisted by American educa-
tors a century and a half ago. With good reason: if this view becomes 
widely held, it can only hasten the decline of the institution. [Pp. 301-02.] 
Having ended on this note, Kirp muses, "It is easier to suggest in broad 
terms what is wanted than to imagine how this might presently be pursued 
... " (p. 302). In Just Schools, the easier path is well travelled; the more 
12. A system would be integrated in accord with constitutional standards if the responsi-
ble authorities had taken appropriate steps to (i) integrate faculties and administration; 
(ii) scrupulously assure equality of facilities, instruction, and curriculum opportunities 
throughout the district; (iii) utilize their authority to draw attendance zones to promote 
integration; and (iv) locate new schools, close old ones, and determine the size and grade 
categories with this same objective in mind. 
413 U.S. at 226 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
13. 413 U.S. at 240 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
14. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. l, 102 S. Ct. 3187, 3208 (1982) (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting) ("Children of all races benefit from neighborhood schooling •••• "), 
The evils of busing are largely symbolic, however, and the vehemence of the opposition to 
busing is completely discordant with the facts concerning it. Over 50% of America's children 
are bused to school, and less than 7% of those are bused for racial purposes. K. ARRINGTON, 
WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: 1954-19?? 37 (U.S. Commn. on Civil Rights, Clearing House 
Publication 69, 1981). Often, integration of a metropolitian area decreases its school busing 
overall. See Pettigrew, The Case far Metropolitan Approaches to Public-Schoo/ Desegregation, 
in RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE CITY 163, 171-72 (A. Yarmolinsky, L. Liebman & C. Schel-
ling eds. 1981). Students walking to school are three times as likely to be involved in accidents 
as those transported by bus. K. ARRINGTON, supra, at 38. Students' academic achievement 
and feelings about their school are largely unaffected by busing itself. See CRAIN, supra note 
8, at 58-60. Finally, metropolitan-area school systems may increase cost efficiency by eliminat-
ing wasteful duplication of facilities in adjacent districts. Florida has adopted a system of 
county-wide school districts, motivated by cost efficiency, not integration. See Pettigrew, supra 
at 171. 
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difficult remains largely uncharted.15 
15. Kirp's book has also been reviewed in Christian Science Monitor, June 21, 1982, at 16. 
